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Commodified Reason in the Neo-Liberal University Discourse: 







In the Autumn of 1918, just weeks before the official end of World War I, a large group 
of medical students at the University of Budapest petitioned the rector of the University 
for the inclusion of psychoanalysis into their academic curriculum, and for the 
appointment of Sándor Ferenczi, the recently elected President of the International 
Psycho-Analytical Association (IPA), to the newly created Chair (Harmat 1988: 71; 
Erős 2011a, 2019).1 Ferenczi first informed Freud of the fact that he had been 
approached by medical students about the possibility of his teaching psychoanalysis at 
the University in a letter dated 25 October 1918, in which he also asked for the matter 
not to be made public in order to avoid ‘unedifying discussions about the principles of 
ψα [sic]’ (Falzeder, Brabant & Giampieri-Deutsch 1996: 303-4). Nonetheless, socio-
political turmoil in Hungary following the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, paired with strong opposition to the proposal of integrating psychoanalysis into 
medical degree courses from the ultra-conservative Hungarian Ministry of Education, 
eventually resulted in Freud agreeing to compose a short position statement on the 
vexed issue of the relationship between psychoanalysis and university education. The 
text was first published in Hungarian in the medical weekly Gyógyászat (Therapy) on 
30 March 1919, some six weeks before Ferenczi was officially appointed under Béla 
Kun’s Hungarian Soviet Republic (the Hungarian Republic of Councils) to the world’s 
                                                 
1 On Ferenczi’s election and term of office as President of the IPA, which was not without 
controversy, so much so that it was effectively repressed from the organisation’s institutional memory 
until the mid-1990s, see Bonomi (1999: 507-10). 
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first Professorship in Psychoanalysis (Mészáros 1998: 208; Erős 2010, 2011a, 2011b; 
Pizarro Obaid 2018).2 
 
 To the best of my knowledge, Freud’s letter to the Hungarians is the only written 
document in which he engaged explicitly with the question concerning the relationship 
between psychoanalysis and the ‘Academy’. For all I know, it is the one and only 
occasion on which Freud expressed himself publicly, and in no uncertain terms, about 
whether psychoanalysis should be recognized academically, as a distinct subject of 
study, in Higher Education Institutions (HEI).3 Freud approached the issue from two 
different angles: from the perspective of psychoanalysis and from that of the university. 
Viewed from the angle of psychoanalysis, he was adamant that psychoanalytic training 
does not need to rely on the university system in order to maintain itself. Although 
psychoanalysts may welcome the integration of psychoanalysis into the university 
curriculum, the academic teaching of psychoanalysis is in a sense superfluous, or at 
                                                 
2 The German text of Freud’s memorandum appeared for the first time in 1969 in the journal 
Das Argument, and was subsequently included in the Nachtragsband to Freud’s Gesammelte Werke 
(Freud 1969, 1987). However, this text is a German translation by Anna Freud of the English translation 
by James Strachey of the Hungarian translation by Ferenczi of Freud’s original text. The original was 
deemed lost until it was discovered, as a letter to Lajos Lévy (the editor of Gyógyászat), by Michael 
Schröter amongst the papers of Max Eitingon, which are preserved in the Israel State Archives in 
Jerusalem. Schröter has also convincingly demonstrated that Freud’s statement did not just serve the 
purpose of endorsing Ferenczi’s appointment, but was part of a broader appeal by prominent academics 
and scholars to reform medical training programmes at Hungarian universities. Rather than relying on 
Strachey’s translation, which is already a ‘third-hand’ rendition of the original document, I will use my 
own English version of Freud’s manuscript, a transcription of which can be found in Schröter (2009, 
2017). For all the political wrangling leading up to it, Ferenczi’s academic tenure was extremely short-
lived, because on 2 August 1919, just one day after the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, his 
post was declared null and void again (Harmat 1988: 76; Erős 2010). At the risk of stating the obvious, 
I should perhaps also remind the reader, here, that Freud’s own academic appointment at the University 
of Vienna was not in psychoanalysis, but in neuropathology, and that despite his Professorship he was 
never a full member of the Faculty of Medicine, which relieved him of the obligation to offer regular 
lectures to students, but which also deprived him of the power to influence decision making strategies. 
See, in this respect, Gicklhorn & Gicklhorn (1960), Eissler (1966) and Jones (1953: 340-41). 
 
3 In a lecture presented in 2010 on the occasion of the centenary of the IPA, the former IPA 
president Cláudio Laks Eizirik opined: ‘Despite his ambivalent position vis-à-vis the University, which 
embraced him with everything but open arms and where he was never given the opportunity to become 
a Full Professor, Freud generally relayed the view that the University was hugely significant for the 
development of his new science and that psychoanalysis should be represented there, since the University 
has always been the place for creative, critical and independent thinking and research in all areas of 
knowledge’ (Laks Eizirik 2011: 286). When formulating this statement, the author did not refer to 
Freud’s letter to the Hungarians which, as we shall see, evinces a rather different stance, nor to any other 
source materials, yet this does not necessarily imply that the position attributed to Freud here is by 
definition wrong or questionable. If nothing else, Laks Eizirik’s formulation leaves us with the task of 
articulating Freud’s views on the University carefully and comprehensively, over and above his 1919 
position paper, which falls beyond the scope of this essay. Here and elsewhere, translations from foreign-
language materials are mine unless otherwise noted. 
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least not a pre-requisite when it comes to ensuring that students of psychoanalysis 
receive the instruction necessary for becoming qualified practitioners. In sum, Freud 
posited that candidates may easily acquire theoretical knowledge about the discipline 
from studying the literature, from attending psychoanalytic conferences, and from 
interacting with established members of psychoanalytic organisations. As to the equally 
important practical experience, this is what they would be able to derive from their own 
analysis, and from conducting their own clinical work under the supervision of 
recognized psychoanalysts. Freud’s programmatic statement would leave a lasting 
imprint on psychoanalytic training programmes for many years to come: 
 
When psychoanalysis is adopted by academic education the psychoanalyst can 
only experience satisfaction, but he can dispense with the University without 
harm. He can find the theoretical instruction that he requires in the literature and 
in a more in-depth fashion at the meetings of the psychoanalytic organisations, 
and also through personal contact with older and more experienced members of 
these organisations. Apart from personal analysis [Selbtsanalyse], he will acquire 
practical experience from the treatment of clinical cases, which he will conduct 
under the direction [Leitung] and supervision [Überwachung] of a recognized 
analyst. 
Schröter 2009: 603 
 
Almost one hundred years after these lines were written, and despite fundamental 
changes to both psychoanalytic training and university education, it remains hard to 
disagree with Freud. In a sense, the very fact that, over the past century, the 
psychoanalytic profession has indeed been able to sustain itself without having to rely 
on the Academy is sufficient proof that Freud’s point of view has retained its strength, 
and does not require any serious reconsideration. 
 
Still, I believe that the peculiar relationship between psychoanalysis and the 
Academy as proposed by Freud in 1919, raises a number of important questions, which 
are as relevant and acute today as they were a hundred years ago. For one, taking the 
training of psychoanalysts outside the university system places a huge burden upon 
psychoanalytic organisations, their institutes and training programmes, insofar as it 
forces them to articulate and justify their own subject benchmarks and what, in 
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contemporary management-speak, one could call their ‘quality assurance procedures’. 
In this respect, the tumultuous history of psychoanalysis has shown that, onerous as the 
task may be, it is not at all impractical or inopportune for psychoanalytic organisations 
to develop their own rigorous training standards, yet seemingly impossible for 
psychoanalysts themselves to agree on what exactly these standards should be, and how 
they should be implemented. 
 
Were I to single out one reason as to why the psychoanalytic organisation Freud 
founded in March 1910, notably upon the insistence of Ferenczi (Freud 1957[1914d]: 
44), has splintered into hundreds of rivalrous psychoanalytic associations, then I would 
be less inclined to consider the wide variety of theoretical orientations than the ongoing 
divergence of opinion with regard to the concrete format psychoanalytic training should 
adopt.4 More than anything else, this is the issue that prompted Lacan and some of his 
followers to leave the Société psychanalytique de Paris (SPP) in 1953 (Miller 1976). 
More than anything else, this is what emboldened the IPA to present their ultimatum to 
Lacan’s group in 1963, with the known consequence of his eventually being 
‘excommunicated’ (Miller 1977). Matters of training also presided over subsequent 
splits in Lacan’s own École freudienne de Paris (EFP) (Roudinesco 1990:  443-77 & 
633-77), and theoretical differences aside these issues lie at the heart of many an intra-
institutional conflict in the world of psychoanalysis. 
 
Whereas no one is likely to dispute Freud’s 1919 recommendation that 
psychoanalytic trainees should gain practical experience from their own analysis and 
from the supervised treatment of patients, the concrete implementation of this relatively 
simple guideline continues to divide the psychoanalytic community. Should there be a 
minimum criterion for the duration of a candidate’s own analysis, and if so what should 
it be? Should the frequency and the duration of the candidate’s analytic sessions be pre-
established? Should a candidate be allocated a training-analyst by a training committee, 
                                                 
4 The oldest, so-called ‘Eitingon-model’ of psychoanalytic training, consisting of formal 
theoretical and technical instruction, a prolonged ‘didactic’ analysis, and analytic supervision, which 
Freud outlined in his letter to the Hungarians, but which would not become formally adopted by the IPA 
until 1920, after the foundation of the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute by Karl Abraham, Max Eitingon 
and Ernst Simmel, is currently one of three accepted training protocols in the IPA. Outside the IPA, 
numerous alternative frameworks have been developed, with many psychoanalytic training organizations 
trying to promote a more communal, libertarian system of training. On the history of the IPA, see 
Loewenberg and Thompson (2011: 1-5). On the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, see Brecht et al. (1985: 
32-6) and Fuechtner (2011). 
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or should trainees be allowed to choose their own analyst? If the latter, should the 
analyst be a practitioner within the candidate’s training organisation, or should the pool 
of qualified analysts be extended to all practicing psychoanalysts, irrespective of their 
affiliation and seniority? Should the training-analyst decide whether the candidate’s 
analysis has sufficiently progressed for him or her to be inducted into the profession, 
or should this decision rest with the training committee? If the latter, which ‘assessment 
criteria’ should the training committee employ, other than the authorised record of 
completion of the candidate’s analytic sessions? What happens if the training 
committee decides that a candidate is not (yet) qualified to work as a psychoanalyst? 
Should candidates be allowed to see patients (under supervision), and if so at what stage 
in their training analysis? Should patients be assigned to candidates, or are candidates 
at liberty to take on any patients who come to them? Should the training analysis de 
facto end when the candidate is admitted to the profession? If not, is it entirely up to 
the candidate to decide how long the training analysis should continue? How does an 
analyst become a training analyst and/or analytic supervisor? Is it purely based on the 
number of years she or he has practiced, or should an analyst apply to the training 
committee or another institutional body? If so, which criteria will this institutional body 
use in order to assess the analyst’s application? How many hours of analytic supervision 
should a candidate complete? Should the candidate be given the freedom to choose his 
or her own supervisor? If so, should the supervisor belong to the organisation in which 
the candidate is training, or can he be chosen from a wider constituency of analytic 
supervisors? How will the supervisor evaluate the candidate’s work? Is the supervisor 
expected to report back to the training committee, and if so what form should the 
supervisor’s report take? And what about the theoretical components of the training-
programme? Should psychoanalytic candidates sit exams, write essays, deliver 
presentations, participate in group-work, complete a dissertation? And then there is the 
even more vexed issue of entry criteria. If candidates are not to be selected on the basis 
of academic qualifications, what will the training committee be looking for? Which 
motivations for analytic training are deemed acceptable and which are deemed 
inadmissible? Should candidates be of a certain age, and have certain professional or 
other qualifications before they can be considered? Should people with a history of 
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mental illness or with a criminal record be de facto excluded from training? Should 
candidates be of good moral character?5 
 
 In some European countries, these pressing concerns, which refer less to how 
psychoanalysis is being transmitted than to how the transmission of psychoanalysis is 
guaranteed, have been ‘resolved’ via the introduction of a form of state regulation, 
which dictates and monitors the overall delivery of psychoanalytic training 
programmes, including entry qualifications, progression criteria and ‘graduation’ 
requirements. In countries where there is no state-controlled regulatory framework, 
such as the UK, professional bodies have stepped in to guarantee the quality and 
standards of training organisations, so that candidates who have completed their 
training in these accredited institutes can become officially registered with a 
professional council or association, and use this registration as a hallmark of quality. 
Needless to say, this does not imply that psychoanalytic training programmes operating 
outside this framework of accreditation are by definition suspect, nor that the 
psychoanalysts they produce are by definition ‘wild practitioners’, even less that those 
psychoanalysts who carry the hallmark of quality are invariably ‘civilized’ and reliable. 
Even though training and practicing under the aegis of a professional body may make 
it easier for practitioners to attract and sustain a steady stream of patients, this 
‘economic benefit’ on the grounds of ‘symbolic capital’ is not guaranteed either, if only 
because psychoanalysts also have to compete for patients with a plethora of other 
mental health care providers, some of whom are generally regarded as more evidence-
based and cost-effective. 
 
 The unintended corollaries of Freud’s 1919 position statement have left the field 
of psychoanalysis hopelessly divided and seriously at risk of professional disintegration 
on account of its own internal inconsistencies. And so I think the time has come to 
                                                 
5 All of these questions, and many more, featured high on Lacan’s agenda during the years 
following the establishment of the Société française de psychanalyse (SFP) in 1953, partly because they 
served to justify the group’s institutional existence, partly because they were also being debated within 
the IPA at the time. Whenever Lacan addressed them directly, often sarcastically and in a highly satirical 
vein, as in his 1953 ‘Rome Discourse’ and in a 1956 paper commemorating the centenary of Freud’s 
birth, it always proved easier for him to criticize the formalistic rules and pragmatic regulations in the 
IPA than to offer a workable alternative. Indeed, a genuine alternative would not be articulated until June 
1964, after Lacan’s ‘excommunication’ and with the creation of the EFP, yet if anything it resulted in 
more internal disagreements and another split. See Lacan (2006[1953]: 197-205; 2006[1956]: 385-406) 
and Roudinesco (1990: 470-7). 
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revisit the relationship between psychoanalysis and the Academy, and to review the 
possible benefits of a ‘strategic partnership’ between the two, in a way which would 
transcend the boundaries of the mainly theoretical delivery of psychoanalysis as a 
stand-alone Masters’ programme or as part of the taught Undergraduate or Postgraduate 
provision in a relevant Higher Education degree course.6 For sure, various objections 
could be raised against this type of initiative. First of all, the regulations governing the 
academic curriculum, with their emphasis on contact hours, learning outcomes, credits 
and degree classifications, would seem totally anathema to the required openness and 
flexibility of psychoanalytic training. Secondly, conventional academic assessment 
tools, such as examinations and essays, may be considered unsuitable or insufficient 
for evaluating a candidate’s psychoanalytic knowledge, skills and experience. Third, 
the requirement for psychoanalytic candidates to pursue their own analysis and conduct 
clinical work under supervision might seem impossible to integrate into an academic 
curriculum. 
 
Credible as these challenges may seem, I believe they are not particularly 
significant. The incommensurability between psychoanalysis and the Academy on the 
aforementioned grounds is definitely overstated. All the psychoanalytic training 
programmes outside the University system that I am familiar with already draw to some 
extent on the traditional academic format of lectures and seminars for the candidates’ 
theoretical instruction. As such, the Academy has always already been present within 
psychoanalytic training institutions, and I think it is fair to say that, although lecture 
courses may be less regulated there in terms of aims and objectives, learning outcomes 
and assessments, the style and format of these lectures are not always vastly different 
from the way in which academic lecturers would deliver their teaching.7 True, 
                                                 
6 On the emergence and development of academic programmes in ‘psychoanalytic studies’ at 
UK universities until the mid-1990s, see Stanton & Reason (1996). Over the last twenty years, many of 
the programmes discussed in this book have been either closed down, or transformed into broader degrees 
in ‘psycho-social studies’, partly owing to staff turnover, yet mainly on account of the corporatisation of 
higher education, to which I shall return later on in this essay. As to the literature on psychoanalysis and 
the Academy, this is by no means as expansive as one may think. There are numerous books and papers 
on the challenges of teaching psychoanalysis, but relatively few in-depth analyses of the relation between 
psychoanalysis and the university as a social institution of higher education. Readers wishing to explore 
the issue further may start with Borgogno & Cassullo (2010), Borgogno (2011), Chaudhary et al. (2018), 
Ferraro (2008), Giampieri-Deutsch (2010), Kernberg (2011), Lackinger & Rössler-Schülein (2017), 
Laplanche (2004), Shengold (1979) and Wallerstein (2009, 2011). 
 
7 Between 1953 and 1963, Lacan delivered his weekly seminar under the auspices of the 
psychoanalytic training programme of the SFP at Sainte-Anne Hospital in Paris. Had he been asked to 
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psychoanalytic training organisations do not award degree classifications, and I cannot 
imagine what a ‘second-class honours’ psychoanalyst would look like, yet they do often 
rely on a core curriculum with a set number of contact hours between trainee and 
instructor, as well as annual progression criteria and an academic life-cycle, starting at 
the end of September and ending in June, spanning three or four years of part-time 
study. As to assessment tools, academic regulations are effectively much more flexible 
than what is generally assumed when it comes to evaluating students’ performance on 
a given module or level of study. If anything, academic institutions value and support 
innovation in assessment, as long as it can be demonstrated that the chosen approach 
still allows for a robust evaluation of the students’ performance with regard to the stated 
learning outcomes. It is not uncommon for university students to be assessed, wholly 
or in part, on the basis of presentations to other students, study diaries, class-
participation, process notes, pieces of creative writing, and individually or collectively 
designed objects. Firmly embedded and distinctly convenient as the traditional 
examination or essay may be, these are by no means the only options in the academic’s 
assessment toolkit, and academics are often rewarded for their dedication and 
inventiveness if they suggest feasible alternatives. Furthermore, psychoanalytic 
training institutions do not dispense with academic evaluation either, inasmuch as 
candidates generally have to do more than simply attend the lectures and seminars, and 
are routinely expected to produce one or more papers in order to progress to the next 
level of training. 
 
As to the requirement of analytic candidates undertaking their own analysis and 
conducting supervised treatment of clinical cases, this does not represent an 
insurmountable problem either. Many universities actively encourage students to 
undertake one or more work placements, not in the least because these integrated 
‘academic apprenticeships’ are considered to enhance their employability. Universities 
also unapologetically use this component of the curriculum in their marketing and 
recruitment strategies, and they (correctly) believe it significantly increases their 
chances of improving their position in national league tables of graduate employment 
and higher education ‘leavers’ destinations’ statistics. Universities have also found 
                                                 
present his seminar at a HEI, or had the psychoanalytic training programme been organised and overseen 
by an academic body, I am not convinced the style and format would have dramatically changed. 
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creative ways to assess students’ achievements in this part of their degree course. For 
example, an undergraduate student in psychology undertaking a work placement with 
a pre-approved employer is commonly expected to submit an academic essay on a topic 
germane to the work environment as well as a reflective report on their personal and 
professional experience. Both pieces of work are graded ‘pass’ or ‘fail’, yet the latter 
option is rarely used, unless the student has failed to adhere to the terms and conditions 
of their (verbal or written) contract, has not complied with their key duties and 
responsibilities, or has broken university and/or employment regulations, including the 
‘law of the land’, and is thus regarded as ‘professionally unsuitable’. Students reading 
for a degree course in medicine or one of the allied health professions, and those 
studying for a higher professional doctorate, such as a Clinical Doctorate or a Doctorate 
of Public Health, are invariably required to undertake an extensive period of supervised 
work, which is rigorously assessed by a team of established professionals on the basis 
of both work performance and (if relevant) technical research skills and mainstream 
academic outputs (treatment protocols, clinical records, data analysis, case conferences 
etc.). It needs to be reiterated, however, that universities generally do not have a stated 
rule that each and every component of a degree course needs to be formally assessed. 
Although students may be required to demonstrate that they have completed all the core 
elements of their course before they can graduate, this does not imply that all of these 
elements were also individually assessed. A personal analysis might thus very well be 
included as an indispensable, core part of the academic training programme, without 
there being a need for this part of the course to be assessed separately.8 
 
                                                 
8 Strange as it may sound to refer to the ‘assessment’ of someone’s personal analysis, this is 
precisely what many psychoanalytic training organizations have struggled with since the principle was 
first formally introduced back in 1920. All psychoanalytic training institutions agree that a candidate’s 
personal analysis is a non-negotiable part of the programme, and a necessary (if not sufficient) pre-
condition for anyone gaining access to the psychoanalytic profession. Unfortunately, this is also where 
the agreement stops, and no one has ever come up with a truly watertight answer to the question as to 
how this personal analysis should be ‘assessed’ in terms of the candidates’ progression through their 
training. In other words, although it is generally accepted that no one can become a psychoanalyst without 
having undertaken a personal analysis, no one has ever been able to capture what exactly this personal 
analysis should entail, much less how one can reliably know that it has indeed been properly undertaken 
and has given rise to what one may reasonably expect from a successful (training) analysis. In the absence 
of a solid qualitative criterion, and a commensurate ‘assessment tool’ for operationalizing this criterion, 
institutions routinely rely on secondary measures, such as the competence of the training analyst, the 
number of hours the candidate was in analysis, the candidate’s ‘record of attendance’, the trainee’s 
presentation of a reflective report on the analysis etc. Yet none of these measures adequately capture the 
quality, or even the ‘mark’ of the candidate’s analytic experience as a training experience, whatever this 
quality may be. 
 10 
In my view, none of the aforementioned objections to the full inclusion of 
psychoanalytic training in the Academy constitutes a major obstacle, because they 
largely concern practical issues that can be resolved under existing university statutes 
and ordinances, and within the confines of good academic governance. The various 
objections against psychoanalysis, as opposed to psychoanalytic studies, becoming 
more integrated into the academic system can thus be dismissed as irrelevant or 
inapplicable. In addition, the benefits of such a re-integration cannot be overestimated. 
Heeding Freud’s proposed curriculum for a psychoanalytic training programme in his 
essay on lay-analysis, in which he advocated the teaching of such diverse subjects as 
biology, sociology, anatomy, mythology and literature, the Academy may offer many 
more opportunities for candidates to study these disciplines that any vocational training 
programme allows for (Freud 1955[1926e]: 246). Secondly, when it comes to 
guaranteeing the quality of training, the burden and responsibility would not just befall 
upon the psychoanalytic organisation, but would at least be a shared concern—
accreditation bodies validating already established academic programmes rather than 
mere professional or vocational courses, complaints and litigation charges being 
investigated and addressed by the university’s governance and legal office, and the 
academic ‘imprint’ in itself offering candidates an additional certificate of achievement. 
Third, since the theoretical instruction would be delivered by qualified lecturers and 
academic researchers, the quality of the teaching might be of a considerably higher 
standard than what is routinely encountered in non-academic vocational training 
programmes, which often struggle to find people who are willing and able to deliver 
the theoretical components of the course, or at least to maintain a teaching standard that 
is attuned to the requirements and the level of the degree course. 
 
There is, however, another much more fundamental and much more intractable 
issue that may preclude a productive ‘strategic partnership’ between psychoanalysis 
and the Academy. It concerns the second angle of Freud’s letter to the Hungarians, in 
which he addressed the question of the teaching of psychoanalysis in universities from 
the perspective of the university. In this respect, Freud started with a general 
observation: 
 
For the University, the question [of the teaching of psychoanalysis] is whether it 
is altogether prepared to acknowledge the significance of psychoanalysis for the 
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training of physicians and scientists. If this is indeed the case, then the University 
can also no longer reject the safeguards for the teaching of psychoanalysis within 
its setting. 
Schröter 2009: 603 
 
The question as to whether psychoanalysis could or should be part of the Academy is 
thus also crucially conditioned by the Academy’s willingness to accommodate 
psychoanalysis as an academic discipline. In an attempt to force the Academy’s hand, 
Freud offered three reasons as to why this significance is not in doubt: 1. Teaching 
psychoanalysis to medical students will make physicians more skilled at recognizing 
the importance of mental factors in the aetiology and treatment of organic diseases; 2. 
Psychoanalysis should be an essential component of the academic training of 
psychiatrists, because it allows for a proper understanding of mental illness, in a field 
that is almost entirely reduced to description; 3. Because the method of psychoanalysis 
has yielded important results outside the clinical sphere, in the social sciences and the 
humanities, students in these disciplines also stand to benefit from its inclusion in the 
curriculum (Schröter 2009: 604-5). 
 
A century after Freud formulated these arguments, their strength has not 
diminished, yet their value has progressively decreased, to the point where anyone 
rehearsing Freud’s line of reasoning is probably at risk of being identified as a residual 
anachronism in the tower of contemporary scientific research. Irrespective of their area 
of specialisation, few 21st century medical doctors would accept that mental factors 
play an important role in human pathological processes, and those that do would no 
doubt gladly assuage the adverse impact of psychological influences either by 
prescribing psychotropic drugs, because it has allegedly been proven that most mental 
disorders originate in one or the other chemical imbalance in the human brain, or by 
initiating a course of cognitive behaviour therapy, because it is purportedly evidence-
based and cost-effective. If, during Freud’s lifetime, psychiatrists were already 
extremely wary of the highly speculative explanations psychoanalysis had come up 
with, their 21st century colleagues perceive the psychoanalyst as an astrologer amongst 
the astronomers, a creationist amongst the Darwinians, an alchemist amongst the 
biomedical scientists. To the extent that understanding mental disorders is on the 
psychiatric agenda, enlightenment is not expected to emanate from detailed 
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psychoanalytic case-formulations, but from the hugely sophisticated wonder that is the 
fMRI scanner, from genetic mapping, and from randomized controlled drug trials. And 
if the psychoanalytic understanding of mental disorders has been discredited, or 
replaced with measurably superior hypotheses, why should anyone working in the field 
of mental health care give credence to its clinical paradigm, which is not evidence-
based, not cost-effective, time-consuming and labour-intensive? Just as people are free 
to seek help from crystal-healers, aromatherapists, osteopaths and acupuncturists, they 
are welcome to consult a psychoanalyst, spend oodles of cash on talking for years to a 
hoary spectral figure who is predominantly silent, and reap the psycho-social benefits 
from it, yet this does not imply that psychoanalysis should become part of an academic 
training programme in medicine or psychiatry. In sum, in this case it is not the Academy 
which is likely to veto the formal inclusion of psychoanalysis into the medical 
curriculum, but the medical cum psychiatric professions themselves, purely on account 
of their having signed up more than ever before to the naturalistic model of human 
development. 
 
Away from the academic training programmes in medicine and its various sub-
disciplines and specialisations, we should of course also contemplate the possibility of 
psychoanalysis being re-established as a professional training programme in the 
Academy under the format of a stand-alone course of study, whether as part of the 
social sciences or in the humanities.9 Although in this case some resistance is to be 
expected from psychoanalysts themselves, who may disapprove of their vocational 
training programmes being absorbed wholly or in part by the Academy, as a totally 
unnecessary concession to an ideological state apparatus and a potentially pernicious 
loss of professional independence, I believe that here it is primarily the University itself 
which will show its teeth again.10 For many years, I really wanted to believe that the 
                                                 
9 In his letter to the Hungarians, Freud did not consider this option, which should not be 
interpreted as evidence of the fact that he wanted to reserve psychoanalytic training to medical doctors, 
but as a mere consequence of the purpose his position paper was serving, i.e. a justification for the 
teaching of psychoanalysis in an academic medical school. 
 
10 In the UK, quite a few training programmes in psychoanalysis or psychotherapy that operate 
outside the University system are still ‘validated’ by it, and whilst this is not a pre-requisite for the 
programme to be accredited by a professional body, such as the United Kingdom Council of 
Psychotherapy (UKCP), training committees often actively pursue this validation because it makes the 
programme more appealing to applicants, brings additional kudos, and potentially allows for disputes, 
appeals and complaints to be dealt with by a larger structure of governance. 
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profound and persistent academic suspicion towards psychoanalysis, at least in the 
Western world, had something to do with the controversial social status of Freud’s 
theory and practice, or more insidiously with the fundamental disparity between the 
place and function of knowledge in the university discourse and its position in the 
discourse of the psychoanalyst, as Lacan outlined in his 1969-‘70 seminar on the theory 
of the four discourses (Lacan 2007).11 Indeed, the way in which the University 
traditionally promotes knowledge and understanding—as goods that can be taught, 
learnt and transferred—appears to be at odds with the psychoanalytic outlook on 
knowledge, as something that is intrinsically fractured and perennially open to 
revision.12 However, after having functioned for quite some time within a 
psychoanalytic organisation, and after having witnessed for many years how quite a 
few psychoanalytic organisations operate with knowledge, I now believe that what 
Lacan designated as the ‘discourse of the university’—even in its spectacular  
convergence with the neo-liberal imperatives of late capitalism, which favour cost-
effectiveness, efficiency savings, business plans, SMART objectives, transparent 
measures of success, key performance indicators and student employability—is still 
less epistemically self-serving, and often more attuned to invention and innovation than 
many a psychoanalytic organisation.13 It is arguably the case that academic research is 
no longer as free as it used to be, if only because academics are expected to tailor their 
projects to national research agendas, or to operationalize the themes identified by 
research councils and other funding bodies, in order to maximize their chances of 
success when applying for research grants (an excellent key performance indicator if 
                                                 
11 I am too unfamiliar with the history and the operational principles of HEIs in Argentina and 
Brazil to comment on the reasons as to why psychoanalysis remains so prominent in their University 
system, both as a separate course of study and as an academic subject in the social sciences and the allied 
health professions. Outside these and other South American countries, the academic suspicion towards 
psychoanalysis is by no means restricted to the Anglo-American world, but has long since invaded many 
non-Anglophone universities in Scandinavia and Western Europe. Even in France, where psychoanalysis 
has been taught in almost all academic psychology departments since the early 1950s, and where some 
HEIs have offered full clinical training programmes in psychoanalysis since the early 1970s, 
psychoanalysis in the Academy is at risk of becoming extinct—the latest example being the announced 
closure of the Training and Research Unit (UFR) in Psychoanalytic Studies at Paris VII (Roudinesco 
2019). For a historical survey of the disciplinary and institutional conflicts between psychoanalysis and 
academic psychology in France, see Ohayon (1999). 
 
12 For a detailed exposition of the peculiar status of knowledge in psychoanalysis, see Nobus & 
Quinn (2005). 
 
13 For the reader who is not au fait with SMART objectives, I am happy to disclose that these 
are Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Timely. 
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there ever was one). Yet knowledge-economic constraints aside, the academy is still a 
place where research is valued, where knowledge is questioned and advanced, and 
where new ideas and a spirit of discovery have a good chance of being fostered. When, 
in 1919, Freud outlined what a psychoanalyst needs, and how these needs could easily 
be met outside the university system, he forgot to mention one cardinal thing, notably 
that the psychoanalyst needs to learn to become a researcher—someone who is capable 
of questioning knowledge, someone who is prepared to unlearn, someone who can 
listen and observe from a position of ignorance.14 Whatever may be said about the 
corporatisation of HEIs and the broader knowledge-economy in which they are 
embedded, universities generally still inspire critical thinking. Unfortunately, this is not 
always the case in psychoanalytic training institutions, where candidates are often 
merely expected to assimilate and regurgitate the knowledge of the masters, and critical 
thinking is actively discouraged, especially when the objects of critique are the 
éminences grises to whom the organisation has sold its soul.15 The same is true for free 
speech, or whatever is left of this freedom after the legal restrictions have been 
ascertained. Corporatized and commodified, the Academy still prides itself on being a 
place where ideas can be debated, and where staff, students and members of the public 
can engage in open discussion on the widest range of topics of human interest, 
controversial and polemical as some of the ideas and their promoters may be.16 Not so 
in psychoanalytic organisations, where certain ideas and some individuals are 
                                                 
14 Freud would articulate the convergence between psychoanalytic treatment and research most 
emphatically in his 1927 postscript to ‘The Question of Lay Analysis’, in which he stated: ‘In 
psychoanalysis there has existed from the very first an inseparable bond between cure and research. 
Knowledge brought therapeutic success. It was impossible to treat a patient without learning something 
new; it was impossible to gain fresh insight without perceiving its beneficent results. Our analytic 
procedure is the only one in which this precious conjunction is assured’ (Freud 1955[1927a]: 256). 
 
15 It is generally less problematic for candidates to criticize scholars and practitioners belonging 
to a rival organisation, or whose work falls outside the remit of psychoanalysis altogether, yet it is better 
still to remain silent about these figures, unless the masters have shown the way. Criticizing the masters 
themselves, however, is tantamount to signing one’s professional death warrant or being formally 
excluded on the grounds of civil disobedience and gross moral turpitude, whereby a complimentary 
diagnosis of perversion is not at all infrequent. 
 
16 In the UK, the National Union of Students has a no-platform policy, which states that no 
proscribed person or organisation should be given a platform to speak at a university event. The Oxford 
Union and the Cambridge University Students’ Union have distanced themselves from it, yet this has not 
stopped students from protesting against the hosting of certain speakers. Despite these protests and 
campaigns—a recent example being the attempt to bar Germaine Greer from speaking at the University 
of Cardiff on the grounds of her being a ‘TERF’ (trans-exclusionary radical feminist)—universities 
generally do not give in to no-platforming demands, unless they feel that the presence of a speaker on 
campus poses serious security risks. 
 
 15 
implicitly, yet forcefully excluded from entering the cenacle, in most cases on account 
of the fact that they are heretical, i.e. not in accordance with the intellectual constitution 
and the doctrinal principles of the association.17 
 
Before I am being accused of holding grossly outdated and terribly naïve views 
about the 21st century Academy, I should indicate that I do believe there is a massive, 
seemingly impregnable obstacle to the future of psychoanalysis as a stand-alone 
professional course of study in contemporary HEIs. It is the same obstacle that has been 
responsible for the arts and humanities being threatened with closure since the turn of 
the last century; the same obstacle that has radically transformed the aims of Higher 
Education and that has turned the Academy into a major tool of the gross national 
product. The obstacle is not always visible, and is often cleverly disguised by university 
managers underneath the latest managerial newspeak, yet it controls each and every 
aspect of the Academy, from the selection, recruitment and promotion of staff to the 
strategic review of academic disciplines, and from all policies governing the student 
life cycle to all procedures regulating research activities. Apart from teaching and 
research, which is what universities are expected to excel in, the obstacle also affects 
academic professional services to staff and students, such as human resources, student 
support and welfare, library services, health and safety, estates and infrastructure, staff 
development, accommodation and residences, and media services. It is called money. 
 
Back in 1969, when Lacan introduced his theory of the four discourses, each of 
the four quadripartite formulae was designed to represent a specific type of social bond, 
yet only one coincided with an established social institution (Lacan 2007: 20-4).18 
Lacan was reluctant to name it at first, because he felt that it ‘would create too many 
misunderstandings’ (Lacan 2007: 21), but as his seminar unfolded he designated it as 
the discourse of the university, without therefore offering his audience much guidance 
as to how the relationship between the four terms in this particular structure should be 
understood. Of the four discourses Lacan presented and unpacked in 1969-’70, the 
                                                 
17 This practice of ‘closing the ranks’ is everything but new. After Lacan broke with the SPP in 
June 1953, he was prevented from speaking at the 18th congress of the IPA, which was held in London 
at the end of July that year. See Lacan (2006[1953]: 199). 
 
18  On the discourse as a social bond, see also Lacan (1981: 5). 
 
 16 
university discourse received the least attention, despite the fact that Lacan had initially 
expressed his concern that its very name may lead to misunderstandings. Within the 
space of this essay, I cannot perform the task of glossing Lacan’s discourse of the 
university in extenso, because this would require too much explication and 
elaboration.19 Also, for the sake of my argument, it suffices that I concentrate on a small 
number of features of the formula, which can effectively be re-written as a logical 
sequence: S1  S2  a  $. 
 
As Lacan conceived it fifty years ago, the discourse of the university is ruled by 
knowledge, or at least by a semblance of something approaching an ‘epistemic 
narrative’. This is not the S1, but the S2 in the above sequence. However, knowledge in 
the place of the agency does not imply that knowledge is also an autonomous, self-
regulating force. The driver and organiser of knowledge is situated outside its frame of 
reference, in what Lacan defined as the place of truth (Lacan 2007: 169). In the 
discourse of the university, this place of truth is occupied by a master signifier, S1. At 
no given point during his seminar did Lacan explain what it means for S1 to be in the 
place of truth, or what exactly this ‘hidden’ master signifier represents, yet the mere 
fact that it is held to control knowledge from the place of truth is tantamount to its only 
ever being ‘half-said’, as an extremely powerful yet surreptitious factor which is always 
‘at work’ but which can never be fully identified in its concrete, discerning 
characteristics. As to the place and function of a, Lacan clarified, notably in an 
exchange with students on the steps of the Panthéon in Paris, that in the university 
discourse this a represents the exploited, who generally go by the name of students 
(Lacan 2007: 147-8). The $, then, is what falls out of the discourse, both in the sense 
of ‘result’ and as ‘residue’ or ‘waste product’, and which cannot be recuperated into its 
production process. Although Lacan did not spend much time on this $ in the university 
discourse either, $ operating in the place of product-loss could be interpreted here as 
the (largely unintended) fabrication of a radical deficiency, which may express itself in 
a multitude of ‘symptoms’, ranging from frustration and disappointment to anger and 
resentment. 
                                                 
19 Apart from Lacan’s own seminar, readers interested in studying the university discourse in 
the context of the structure and applications of Lacan’s discourse theory may benefit from Quackelbeen 
& Verhaeghe (1984), Quackelbeen (1994), Verhaeghe (1995), Boucher (2006), Tomšič (2015: 199-229) 




Were Lacan to have delivered his seminar in 2019, I do not believe that he 
would have had to worry all that much about being misunderstood when he laid out the 
terms and conditions of the university discourse. Indeed, I would even go so far as to 
claim that his designation of the aforementioned sequence of terms would have been 
grasped instantly by his 21st century audience. In 1969, in the aftermath of the student 
revolts and in the wake of a new French government initiative to reform Higher 
Education, it may have been difficult for people to see what Lacan was talking about 
when he presented the university discourse. Fifty years down the line, it is blatantly 
obvious.20 According to many a contemporary university’s vision and mission 
statement, it is driven by the ambition to transmit and advance knowledge and 
understanding in its areas of specialisation, yet it does not require great acumen to 
acknowledge that this laudable cause is but a clever ruse, or a mere semblance of what 
really drives the system, an elusive yet mighty S1 called money. The upshot of money 
functioning in the place of truth in the university discourse is that knowledge (reason) 
itself becomes commodified, and that the difference between good (acceptable) and bad 
(unacceptable) knowledge is no longer based on an evaluation of its intrinsic qualities, 
but on an assessment of its monetary value, i.e. the extent to which it is capable of 
generating income.21 Research institutes are marketable revenue centres, academic 
disciplines are profitable educational service areas, academic papers are lucrative 
research outputs, and universities are incubators of economic growth.22 Students are 
                                                 
20 And it could not have been more obvious from the English edition of Lacan’s seminar, in 
which the two constitutive ‘operators’ of the four discourses—of impossibility and impotence—have 
been consistently replaced with the euro-symbol € throughout the book. This volume was also the last in 
the series of Lacan seminars in English translation published by W. W. Norton & Company, for monetary 
reasons . . . 
 
21 In an academic career spanning almost thirty years, I have been told on more than one 
occasion that my papers, like this one here, are totally worthless, because they are not published in 
journals with high-impact factors and are unlikely to generate research grant income on account of their 
discordance with research council agendas. Since books do not have impact factors, they should not be 
pursued at all. Chapters in books are equally meritless, and researchers agreeing to submit an essay for 
inclusion in an edited collection have stupidly missed a valuable opportunity for seeing their work appear 
in a trusted, high-impact academic journal. 
 
22 It is also in this sense that we should understand the university’s keenness to see their research 
centres being endowed with a catchy, marketable name, preferably derived as a memorable acronym 
from its alleged areas of research, like the Centre for Research into Infant Behaviour (CRIB). It took me 
a while to realise, but now I finally understand why my proposals to set up a Centre for Research into 
Applied Psychoanalysis and a Centre for User-friendly New Technologies were never taken forward. . . 
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educational service users recruited from a competitive pool of customers who, as 
consumers of higher education, are being fooled into believing that they are in the 
driver’s seat as proper ‘partners in education’ (PIEs), but who are unwittingly 
commodified and exploited as aspiring, economically productive workers. Universities 
like to say that they are entirely focused on the ‘student experience’ and that ‘student 
satisfaction’ is increasing year on year, yet apart from this being another excellent 
marketing tool, the ‘student experience’ also feeds into a national student survey and a 
teaching evaluation framework, which in turn inform league tables and university 
rankings, and thus institutional reputation and measures of excellence, which may 
affect student recruitment, tuition fees and, when all is said and done, the annual 
balance sheet.23 Students themselves increasingly identify as consumers of a higher 
education service who have the right to apply Value for Money principles when it 
comes to evaluating the quality of the education they receive, yet in reality they do not 
understand that by entering the university discourse and participating in its structure 
they have already been commodified as the economic benefactors of the institution’s 
‘educational gains’ (formerly known as ‘learning outcomes’). Whether students 
eventually come to acknowledge that they spent three or four years being exploited by 
an institution promising ‘higher education’ but in reality primarily imbuing them with 
transferable skills ready for the job-market probably does not make much of a 
difference with regard to the net result of the educational equation: a painfully negative 
bank balance, long years of crushing student debt, little or no confidence in one’s 
knowledge base (which never seems to have been addressed or developed anyway) and 
lingering questions as to why those student years passed so quickly and what purpose 
they really served other than filling the financial coffers of the university. 
 
Given the commodification of both knowledge and its recipients in the current 
neo-liberal university discourse, which fits Lacan’s 1969 formula like a glove and much 
better than its historical equivalent, I should admit that psychoanalysis (as a theoretical 
paradigm and a fortiori as a clinical protocol for the treatment of a wide range of mental 
health issues) is extremely unlikely to survive and thrive in an academic structure 
                                                 
23 In the UK, the majority of universities have charitable status, which means that they are de 
facto and de jure not-for-profit, yet all the academic institutions I have ever worked in nonetheless try to 
ensure that the annual budget shows a good surplus, which is not only favourable in terms of the 
university’s financial sustainability, but also in terms of the vice-chancellor’s annual salary. 
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which, more than ever before, is controlled by the filthy lucre, because it is bound to be 
regarded as unviable, which in this case is but a synonym for unprofitable.24 And much 
as I would like, it is difficult to formulate a counter-argument to this, unless I would 
rehearse the (entirely justified) response that universities should not just accommodate 
and support the profitable subjects (the so-called STEM subjects of Science, 
Technology, Engineering and Mathematics), that they should start reconsidering the 
intrinsic value of intellectual inquiry, and that a genuinely democratic society needs 
psychoanalysis, much like it needs the arts and humanities—indeed, that the primary 
goal of a HEI should be to contribute to the formation and development of ‘good 
citizenship’, as defined by a versatile ability to care for oneself and others against the 
background of a firmly embedded set of ethical principles.25 Yet for all this doom and 
gloom—and I do not for a moment accept that universities may change, and will 
eventually come to realise that the money-signifier is not nearly as important as they 
think it is—we should not ignore the fact that psychoanalysis is still widely taught, 
either as a method or as a body of knowledge in its own right, in what is left of the 
human and social sciences, and in the arts and humanities. 
 
This ‘unofficial’ academic presence of psychoanalysis, as an almost clandestine 
body of knowledge which shapes and informs a wide range of subjects, reflects the 
third of Freud’s three-partite exposition of how universities may stand to benefit (if not 
in financial, at least in educational terms) from the inclusion of psychoanalysis in the 
academic curriculum: students reading for a degree course in what is routinely referred 
to as the ‘liberal arts’ may gain tremendously from the way in which psychoanalysis 
has crucially contributed to our understanding of socio-political processes, human 
relations, psycho-social phenomena such as religion and spirituality, and everything 
that falls under the banner of ‘products of the human creative imagination’. Here, 
psychoanalysis is by definition restricted to its implementation as an ‘applied science’, 
                                                 
24 After having operated quite successfully for almost thirty years, my university decided to 
close down a Masters’ Programme in Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Society, allegedly because it 
did not attract the (randomly imposed) institutional minimum of eighteen full-time students per annum, 
yet in reality because my ‘resources’ would have to be re-directed towards the exponential expansion of 
undergraduate students—the latter bringing in more cash than postgraduate students, because their tuition 
fees are higher and their course of study is longer. 
 
25 For excellent elaborations of this argument and much more, see Bok (2003), Kirp (2003), 
Washburn (2005), Donoghue (2008), Nussbaum (2010), Giroux (2014), Brown (2015: 175-200), Di Leo 
(2017) and Collini (2012; 2017). 
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and is likely to play a secondary role in the students’ chosen degree course, yet its 
shadowy presence has the distinct advantage of leaving it less exposed, and potentially 
less vulnerable to academic scrutiny by the institutional champions of ‘educational 
excellence’. I firmly believe that from this particular position, psychoanalysis, or rather 
those teaching and researching it, should join hands with the emerging discipline of 
‘critical university studies’ which, if it has not been properly recognized by the un-self-
critical proponents of the money-driven university discourse, definitely requires a 
multitude of trans-disciplinary voices to challenge the ongoing commodification of 
reason and the gradual enclosure of the intellectual commons.26 My proposal, here, is 
not for the creation of a new strategic partnership between psychoanalysis and the 
Academy, but rather for the articulation of a mutually beneficial ‘underground alliance’ 
between psychoanalysis and the intellectual movement that has taken the ongoing 
commodification of reason in the neo-liberal university discourse as its prime target. 
Psychoanalysis may not be exceptionally self-critical, yet it is sufficiently critical of 
other discourses for it to have an important role to play in the exposition of the 
university system as a perfidious social bond, much like Lacan demonstrated in his 
1969-’70 seminar. In addition, given the fact that a substantial segment of 
psychoanalytic training outside the University still draws on academic principles, 
practices and procedures, this alliance between psychoanalysis and critical university 
studies may effectively embolden psychoanalysts to review their own training 
standards, to consider the extent to which their own institutional discourse is indebted 
to and imperilled by the trials and tribulations of the university discourse and, most 
importantly, to debate the value and the place of creative, critical and independent 
thinking within their organisation. In other words, I believe that the alliance between 
psychoanalysis and critical university studies may be beneficial institutionally and 
theoretically, as a means to protect the presence of psychoanalytic knowledge in the 
Academy, but may also offer a new opportunity for vocational psychoanalytic training 
programmes that operate outside the University system to evaluate their internal 
politics, to gauge their own (implicit) commodification, to test their institutional values 
and to re-articulate the touchstones of psychoanalytic training. Psychoanalysis may not 
need the University, then, to sustain itself, but it may take advantage from the rise of 
                                                 
26 For a fine survey of the history and current status of critical university studies, see Williams 
(2018). 
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critical university studies to newly reflect upon the series of obdurate questions about 
the concrete implementation of a psychoanalytic training programme, which have 
loomed large over the social and professional sustainability of psychoanalysis ever 
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